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Commentary by Co-Defendant's Counsel on Defendant's 
Refusal To Testify: A Violation of the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination? 
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution protects the 
individual from being compelled in any criminal case to testify against 
himself. 1 Under the framework of the American criminal justice sys-
tem, the state bears the full responsibility for proving the defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The fifth amendment ensures that in 
this endeavor the defendant will not be forced to aid or contribute to 
the state's case. Furthermore, the defendant's choice to remain silent 
at his trial should not influence the traditional presumption of inno-
cence. 2 The jury is typically instructed that a defendant is presumed 
innocent independent of his decision to testify.3 
The defendant's decision on whether to testify is by no means an 
easy one. If he takes the stand he risks that his appearance or manner-
isms may prejudice the jury against him and that his prior criminal 
convictions may be highlighted.4 Additionally, the defendant faces the 
prosecutor's clever questioning and the associated strain, embarrass-
ment, and confusion. On the other hand, if a defendant chooses not to 
testify he risks jury speculation about his motivations for remaining 
silent, speculation which often, and some argue justifiably, runs to a 
presumption of guilt. 5 
Compounding the defendant's dilemma is the possibility that the 
prosecutor or a co-defendant's counsel will comment to the jury on his 
decision to remain silent. The Supreme Court has held prosecutorial 
comments on a defendant's courtroom silence to be a violation of a 
defendant's fifth amendment rights. 6 A similar threat to a defendant's 
privileged silence arises in multiple-defendant criminal trials when the 
attorney for one of the testifying defendants contrasts his client's will-
ingness to testify with another defendant's silence. The suggestion to 
1. The fifth amendment states, in relevant part, "nor shall [any person] be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself ..•. " U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
2. See 1 E. DEVITT & c. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS 
§ 17.14 (3d ed. 1977). 
3. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981) (nontestifying defendant has a constitutional 
right to ajury instruction that explains the invocation of the fifth amendment does not affect the 
presumption of innocence until proved guilty). 
4. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
6. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text. 
Adverse comment by the trial judge concerning defendant's refusal to testify is also prohibited. 
See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 338-41 (1978) (approving non·adverse comment by trial 
judge); infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
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the jury that the act of testifying should be rewarded while the deci-
sion to exercise a constitutional right should be penalized is deeply 
troubling. 
Currently, the circuits are divided on whether comments by co-
defendants' counsel on a defendant's silence impair that defendant's 
fifth amendment rights. 7 Furthermore, among the circuits that regard 
such commentary as potentially prejudicial, disagreement exists over 
the proper test for identifying such comments. This Note asserts that 
the risk of prejudicing a defendant's fifth amendment rights is too 
great to allow counsel any comment on a defendant's decision to tes-
tify or to remain silent. 
Part I of this Note examines the historical evolution of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination and the policy goals behind the privi-
lege. The Note argues that prohibiting comments on silence by co-
defendant's counsel is consistent with the fifth amendment's historical 
purpose and subsequent interpretation. Part II considers the Supreme 
Court's decision in Griffin v. California 8 and later decisions concern-
ing commentary on courtroom silence and applies analytical models 
derived from these decisions to the issue of co-defendant's commen-
tary. Finally, Part III examines the circuit courts' attempts to define a 
standard for identifying comments made by co-defendant's counsel 
that prejudice a defendant's privileged silence. This Part concludes by 
demonstrating the insufficiency of the current tests and by advocating 
a new standard which prohibits all commentary on the act of testify-
ing or on the limitations imposed on some defendants by another de-
fendant's silence. 
!. HISTORICAL PURPOSES OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
Analysis of prejudicial comment by a co-defendant's counsel on a 
defendant's refusal to testify must begin with an examination of the 
fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.9 A relatively 
brief Clause, it provides: "nor shall [any person] be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " 10 To understand 
7. The Sixth Circuit has rejected fifth amendment challenges to comments on defendant's 
silence made by co-defendant's counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985). The First, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
allowed fifth amendment challenges to co-defendant's comments on silence, using a variety of 
standards to identify such comments. See, e.g., United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 110 (1989); United States v. McClure, 734 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1984); 
United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113 
(1st Cir. 1976). See infra Part III. 
8. 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that a prosecutor's comments on a defendant's decision not 
to testify violate the defendant's fifth amendment rights). 
9. See Moreland, Historical Background and Implications of the Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination, 44 KY. L.J. 267, 267 (1956) ("A study of the privilege against self-incrimination, as 
with other issues involving the law, should begin with a history of the privilege."). 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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how such an opaque command could conceivably be violated by court-
room commentary on someone's refusal to testify, it is helpful to ex-
amine the evolution of the fifth amendment and its historic purpose.11 
This Part explores the development of the privilege against self-
incrimination. First, this Part traces the historical common law devel-
opment of the privilege. The discussion focuses on the language of the 
privilege as ultimately adopted in the fifth amendment. Next, the the-
oretical justifications for the privilege offered by courts and commenta-
tors are examined. Finally, this Part reviews the Supreme Court's 
treatment of the privilege against self-incrimination and concludes 
that the prohibition of courtroom commentary on a defendant's si-
lence by his co-defendant's counsel is consistent with the privilege's 
historical purpose and judicial interpretation. 
A. Historical Development of the Fifth Amendment 
An examination of the origins and maturation of the privilege 
against self-incrimination adds insight into its scope. In this vein, 
Judge Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit, in a grand homage to the fifth 
amendment, once wrote: "The history of the development of the right 
of silence is a history of accretions, not of an avulsion."12 
The concept of an accused's privilege against self-incrimination ex-
tends as far back as the twelfth century.13 During this period, bishops 
attempted to question suspects about a range of offenses, while the 
king sought to limit the bishops' questioning to purely ecclesiastical 
subjects.14 In the sixteenth century the privilege arose with respect to 
the English Court of High Commission. That court claimed to have 
inherited from the ecclesiastical courts of the middle ages the right to 
administer the so-called "oath ex officio." Persons who had fallen 
under suspicion regarding their faith or morals were required to take 
this oath, and a refusal to do so was taken as confession of the offense 
charged. While there is some debate over the scope of the privilege at 
this time, the Latin maxim "Nemo tenetur prodere se ipsum" - "no 
one should be required to accuse himself" - emerged as a frequent 
protest against the "oath."15 Despite this maxim, the period was 
marked by the use of torture to extract testimony and confessions 
from criminal suspects.16 By the 1700s, however, it was settled under 
11. In the words of Justice Frankfurter: "The privilege against self-incrimination is a specific 
provision of which it is peculiarly true that 'a page of history is worth a volume of logic.' " 
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 
U.S. 345, 349 (1921)). 
12. De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1962) (footnote omitted). 
13. E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 2 (1962). 
14. Id. 
15. See De Luna, 308 F.2d at 147 n.17; E. GRISWOLD, supra note 13, at 2; Corwin, The 
Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1930). 
16. See z. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 188 (1954); E. GRISWOLD, supra note 13, 
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the English common law that no person could be required under oath 
to answer questions posed to him by a court.17 
The Puritans who settled America carried with them strong oppo-
sition to the inquisitorial system of justice.18 Trials conducted in Mas-
sachusetts as early as 1637 provide evidence of the privilege.19 Other 
groups of settlers also strove to set the new colonies on a distinct 
course away from forced confessions. Section 8 of the Virginia Decla-
ration of Rights of 1776 provides that a person may not "be compelled 
to give evidence against himself,"20 and by 1784 six other state consti-
tutions had granted a similar privilege against self-incrimination.21 
James Madison proposed the privilege against self-incrimination at 
the Constitutional Convention in 1789.22 With regard to this propo-
sal, Professor Levy has noted: 
In presenting his amendments, Madison said nothing whatever that ex-
plained his intentions concerning the self-incrimination clause. Nor do 
his papers or correspondence illuminate his meaning. We have only the 
language of his proposal, and that revealed an intent to incorporate into 
the Constitution the whole scope of the common-law right.23 
Yet, Professor Levy does note that by placing this privilege in the Bill 
of Rights the Framers "were once again sounding the tocsin against 
the dangers of government oppression of the individual .... "24 Pro-
fessor Levy concludes: 
Above all, the Fifth Amendment reflected [the Framers'] judgment that 
in a free society, based on respect for the individual, the determination of 
at 2; L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 33-35 (1968) (torture used during prelimi-
nary examination by justice of the peace and by Privy Council and the Court of the Star Cham-
ber). But see Ellis, Vox Populi v. Suprema Lex: A Comment on the Testimonial Privilege of the 
Fifth Amendment, 55 IOWA L. REv. 829, 835 (1970) (noting that torture was prohibited under 
the common law). 
17. See De Luna, 308 F.2d at 148; E. GRISWOLD, supra note 13, at 3-4; L. LEVY, supra note 
16, at 313; Corwin, supra note 15, at 9. 
18. See De Luna, 308 F.2d at 148; cf. L. LEVY, supra note 16, at 339-54; Pittman, The 
Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. 
L. REV. 763, 775-83 (1935). 
19. E. GRISWOLD, supra note 13, at 4. 
20. VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS§ 8 (1776). The modern constitution of Virginia incorporated this 
pronouncement and now prohibits compulsion "in any criminal proceeding." See VA. CoNsr. 
art. I, § 8; see also L. LEVY, supra note 16, at 405-06; Pittman, supra note 18, at 787-88. 
21. See MD. CoNST. art. 22; MAss. CoNsr. pt. l, art. XII; N.H. CoNsr. pt. l, art. XV; N.C. 
CoNsr. art. 1, § 23; PA. CONsr. art. I,§ 9; VT. CoNsr. ch. I, art. 10. 
22. L. LEVY, supra note 16, at 422. Professor Chafee notes that in 1788 Patrick Henry 
opposed the ratification of the Constitution because it failed to include a privilege against self-
incrimination. Henry protested that without such a protection "Congress may introduce the 
practice of torturing to extort a confession of the crime." Chafee concludes that one reason for 
including the clause against self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights was to quiet such objections. 
Z. CHAFEE, supra note 16, at 188. 
23. L. LEVY, supra note 16, at 423; see also McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 
1967 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 194 (noting the dearth of historical information on the fifth 
amendment). 
24. L. LEVY, supra note 16, at 430. 
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guilt or innocence by just procedures, in which the accused made no 
unwilling contribution to his conviction, was more important than pun-
ishing the guilty.25 
The evolution of the fifth amendment protection against self-in-
crimination does little to indicate its application to the present prob-
lem. The language of the clause does, however, suggest a broad 
reading of the right. The amendment proposed by Madison and ulti-
mately ratified by the states from 1789 to 1791 is "far more compre-
hensive than a [mere] prohibition against self-incrimination."26 By its 
very terms the clause proscribes compulsion to be a witness against 
oneself. Consequently, a criminal defendant does not need to fear 
criminal prosecution to invoke the right; aversion to public disgrace or 
fear of public speaking are sufficient reasons for choosing not to testify. 
With this rather empty historical record and the broad language of the 
amendment, one notion is clear: no evidence exists that the fifth 
amendment does not apply to co-defendant commentary on silence. 
B. Policy Goals Behind the Privilege 
Identifying the policy goals behind the privilege against self-in-
crimination is cumbersome, yet critical. The dozen or so words in the 
Bill of Rights provide little guidance, and the privilege's dyspeptic 
path through history is no more enlightening.27 In determining how 
to construe the privilege it is best to look at the policies that legal 
commentators and the courts have advanced as its justification. 
Professor Wigmore, in his famous treatise on evidence, identifies 
twelve policy justifications in support of the privilege advanced by 
legal scholars ranging from Jeremy Bentham to Dean Erwin Gris-
wold. 28 Wigmore rejects eight of these twelve reasons as "make-
weights," "platitudes," and repetitions of other policy goals, and 
concludes that only four merit serious consideration.29 The four justi-
fications that truly provide support for the fifth amendment are: (1) 
the prevention of torture, by which Wigmore means the coercive use 
of inhumane force (psychological or emotional) to overcome a witness' 
25. Id. at 432; see also Pittman, supra note 18, at 789 ("The provision ••• against compulsory 
self-incrimination not only was an answer to numerous instances of colonial misrule but also was 
a shield against the evils that lurk in the shadows of a new and untried sovereignty."). 
26. See L. LEVY, supra note 16, at 423. 
27. As one commentator has noted: "it is now generally agreed that the 'noble principle' of 
the privilege 'transcends its origins.' " McKay, supra note 23, at 195. 
28. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2251, at 297-318 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
29. The eight justifications for the privilege dismissed by Prof. Wigmore are: 
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reluctance to disclose;30 (2) a means to frustrate "bad laws" and "bad 
procedure,'' especially in the area of political and religious beliefs;31 
(3) protection against vague charges, and unprincipled inquiry into 
matters of dubious social concern;32 and ( 4) the assurance of a fair 
balance of power between the individual and the government that 
forces the government to leave an individual alone until it has, relying 
entirely on its own means, developed sufficient proof of wrongdoing. 33 
It is from the last policy rationale that one can confidently defend 
the applicability of fifth amendment protection to a defendant whose 
silence has been remarked upon by a co-defendant's counsel. With 
respect to the fourth policy, Justice Fortas has commented that, "[t]he 
principle that a man is not obliged to furnish the state with ammuni-
tion to use against him is basic to this conception. . . . A sovereign 
state ... has no right to compel the sovereign individual to surrender 
or impair his right of self-defense."34 To this body of policy, Professor 
Ayer has added: "The concept of an adversary trial, with the judge 
acting primarily as a referee in a struggle between equals - indeed 
between sovereigns - carries into practice this idea of equality in a 
way that the inquisitorial system of the civil-law countries does not."35 
Allowing a co-defendant to draw into question another defendant's 
refusal to testify produces a perception of unfairness. This visceral 
reaction may seem intuitively troubling since the co-defendant's coun-
(1) It protects the innocent defendant from convicting himself by a bad performance on 
the witness stand ...• 
(2) It avoids burdening the courts with false testimony .... 
(3) It encourages third-party witnesses to appear and testify by removing the fear that 
they might be compelled to incriminate themselves; ... 
( 4) It is a recognition of the practical limits of governmental power; truthful self-incrimi-
nating answers cannot be compelled, so why try .... 
(5) It prevents procedures of the kind used by the infamous courts of Star Chamber, 
High Commission and Inquisition .•.. 
(6) It is justified by history, whose tests it has stood; the tradition which it has created is 
a satisfactory one .... 
(7) It preserves respect for the legal process by avoiding situations which are likely to 
degenerate into undignified, uncivilized and regrettable scenes ..•• 
(8) It spurs the prosecutor to do a complete and competent independent investigation. 
Id. at 310-12. 
30. See id. at 315-17. 
31. See id. at 313-14; But sees. HOOK, CoMMON SENSE AND THE FIFfH AMENDMENT 63 
(1957) (arguing that "in a democracy there are more effective ways of contesting bad laws .••. "). 
32. Here, Wigmore views the privilege as a means to prevent purely bothersome and burden-
some questioning. He contends that "[e]ach of us, after all, is a criminal more or less, [but it 
goes] without saying that the law does not intend that all of these crimes be prosecuted." 8 J. 
WIGMORE, supra note 28, at 314-15. 
33. Id. at 313-18. 
34. Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 CLEV. B.A.J. 91, 98-
99 (1954). 
35. Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: Griffin v. California 
After Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. R.Ev. 841, 851 (1980). 
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sel cannot be clearly placed on either side of this "struggle between 
equals." Yet, when counsel attempts to bolster his own client's credi-
bility by contrasting him with a silent defendant, counsel is no longer 
outside of the bipolar balance, but is aiding the state's case. The jump 
itself is not so disturbing; due to judicial reluctance to grant severance, 
co-defendants often try to implicate each other.36 The means by 
which co-defendants implicate each other, however, demands judicial 
attention. Allowing a defendant to comment on his co-defendant's si-
lence forces the nontestifying defendant to aid the state's case against 
his will. If the state, by denying severance, is willing to accept the aid 
of a defendant in the conviction of a co-defendant, it must require the 
testifying defendant to operate under the same standards as the state. 
Therefore, if the constitution demands that the state refrain from com-
ment on defendant's silence, the same demand must be made of a co-
defendant to ensure realistic constitutional protection. 
Some still question the rationality of presuming the innocence of 
silent defendants. A number of fifth amendment critics have argued 
that the privilege against self-incrimination is merely a shield for the 
guilty.37 These critics raise the basic argument that if a defendant 
were innocent he would gladly take the stand and proclaim it; only a 
guilty defendant would fear a prosecutor's questioning.38 
This chain of reasoning, however, ignores the host of compelling 
reasons that might lead a defendant to refuse to testify.39 The defen-
36. See infra note 141. 
37. See, e.g., S. HOOK, supra note 31, at 62-63; Ayer, supra note 3S, at 846, 8SS-S7; McKay, 
supra note 23, at 208. Even Dean Griswold, who had the courage to defend the privilege against 
self-incrimination during its moment of peril - the McCarthy hearings - later accepted the 
argument that "the privilege protects the guilty more often than it does the innocent. It was a 
mistake, I now think, to undertake to defend the privilege on the ground that it is basically 
designed to protect those innocent of crime, at least in any numerical sense." Griswold, The 
Right to Be Let Alone, SS Nw. U. L. REv. 216, 223 (1960); cf. E. GRISWOLD, supra note 13. 
38. See Ayer, supra note 3S, at 8SS & n.S7. 
39. See A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OP 
CRIMINAL CASES § 390, at 2-299 (1967); E. GRISWOLD, supra note 13, at 20-21; Ayer, supra 
note 3S, at 8SS-S6 & n.S7; Bradley, Griffin v. California: Still Viable After All These Year.I', 79 
MICH. L. REV. 1290, 1293 & n.18 (1981); Ellis, supra note 16, at 846-48; Poulin, Evidentiary Use 
of Silence and the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, S2 GEO. WASH. L. RBV. 
191, 222-23 (1984); Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 
24 U. CHI. L. REV. 472, 492-93 (19S7). 
The Supreme Court also has noted on several occasions compelling reasons other than guilt 
that keep defendants off the stand. In Lakeside v. Oregon, 43S U.S. 333, 343 (1978) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting), Justice Stevens stated: "Every trial lawyer knows that some truthful denials of guilt 
may be considered incredible by a jury - either because of their inherent improbability or be-
cause their explanation, under cross-examination, will reveal unfavorable facts about the witness 
or his associates." Furthermore, in Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893), the Court 
recognized: 
It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely innocent of 
the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting 
to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses charged against him, will 
often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather than remove 
prejudices against him. 
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dant may wish not to testify because: (1) he fears that his nervousness 
or appearance might prejudice the jury against him despite his inno-
cence;40 (2) he desires that his prior criminal record not be brought to 
the jury's attention;41 (3) he disapproves of the tribunal or of the accu-
sations against him and does not want to participate in such proceed-
ings; or ( 4) he does not want to reveal suspicious facts that might tend 
to incriminate his friends, family, or associates. Consequently, one in-
voking this constitutional protection should not necessarily be pre-
sumed guilty, and further, a co-defendant's counsel should not be 
allowed to encourage the prohibited inference of guilt.42 
C. Supreme Court's Treatment of the Fifth Amendment 
A careful reading of the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the 
fifth amendment provides further insight into the scope of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. The Court has stated that the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination marks "an important ad-
vance in the development of our liberty - 'one of the great landmarks 
in man's struggle to make himself civilized.' " 43 As for the purposes of 
the protection, the Court has offered a host of justifications that range 
from the protection of innocent persons to the maintenance of an equi-
table justice system.44 In Miranda v. Arizona the Court noted that 
the privilege against self-incrimination - the essential mainstay of our 
adversary system - is founded on a complex of values .... All these 
policies point to one overriding thought: the constitutional foundation 
underlying the privilege is the respect a government - state or federal 
- must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. . .. . [O]ur 
accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seek-
ing to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own 
independent labors. . . . In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the 
person is guaranteed the right "to remain silent unless he chooses to 
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will."45 
40. As one commentator has stated: 
It must be borne in mind that a substantial number of defendants are innocent, and that 
most of these are uneducated, unfortunate persons, frightened by their predicament - no 
match for the prosecutor or for the occasional sharp question from the judge. Such persons 
in a human attempt to escape the long finger of suspicious circumstances would undoubt-
edly trip themselves over an inconsistency or contradiction when and if they take the stand. 
Clapp, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 541, 548 (1956) (footnote 
omitted). 
41. See c. McCoRMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 43 (1954). 
42. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text. 
43. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) (quoting E. GRISWOLD, supra note 
13, at 7); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) ("[The fifth amend-
ment] reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations .... "). 
44. For a comprehensive list of policy justifications including maintenance of a fair state-
individual balance, the inviolability of the human personality, and the protection of the innocent, 
see Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55; see also Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414-16 (1966). 
45. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. l, 8 
(1964)) (emphasis added). 
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With these thoughts in mind, it is difficult to accept that prejudi-
cial remarks on a defendant's silence by co-defendant's counsel 
amount to the state's production of evidence "by its own independent 
labors." Moreover, when a defendant is aware that his refusal totes-
tify may be brought to the jury's attention, often with an implication 
of his guilt, his decision to enjoy his fifth amendment rights is clearly 
not "unfettered." In the words of Justice Black, "[t]he value of consti-
tutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for 
relying on them."46 
Furthermore, construing the fifth amendment to prohibit such 
conduct is consistent with the broad construction which the Supreme 
Court has historically accorded the fifth amendment. As the Court 
has stated, "[t]o apply the privilege narrowly or begrudgingly - to 
treat it as an historical relic, at most merely to be tolerated - is to 
ignore its development and purpose."47 The circuit courts have also 
adopted a broad, policy-based construction; one court, faced with re-
marks by co-defendant's counsel, stated: "It is more important to con-
sider [the fifth amendment's] line of growth as indicative of an 
expanding right capable of encompassing new and novel situations to-
day as in the past."48 
The protection of the privilege against self-incrimination should 
not be constrained by vague categorizations which portray a prosecu-
tor or judge's comment on silence as an impermissible violation of de-
fendant's rights49 and a co-defendant's counsel's remark as mere 
colloquy.50 The privilege has historically sought to prevent direct co-
ercion by the state or coercion engineered by state actors. That this 
coercion comes to us in a new form should not deter its prevention. 
While the history of the privilege against self-incrimination prior 
to its inclusion in the fifth amendment sheds little light on its intended 
purpose, legal commentators and the Supreme Court have since pro-
vided elucidation of this constitutional protection. In order to satisfy 
the identified goals of maintaining a fair balance of power between the 
individual and the state and of allowing a choice of silence that does 
not affect the traditional presumption of innocence, it follows that co-
defendant commentary on silence must be prohibited. 
46. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 425 (1957) (Black, J., concurring). 
47. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955); see Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 
422, 426 (1956) ("This constitutional protection must not be interpreted in a hostile or niggardly 
spirit."). 
48. De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 150 (5th Cir. 1962); see also Gompers v. United 
States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1915) (The significance of constitutional provisions "is to be gathered 
not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of 
their growth."). 
49. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
50. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837 
(1985); see infra text accompanying notes 107-10. 
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Moreover, the Supreme Court's evaluation of the fifth amend-
ment's purpose indicates that the Court views the protections offered 
as an integral element in the maintenance of an equally balanced ad-
versary process. This ideal is compromised gravely by allowing one 
defendant to make statements that would be prohibited if made by the 
state, which have precisely the same adverse effect on the silent defen-
dant's constitutional rights and which are predicated on the court's -
the state's - acquiescence. Furthermore, state involvement is readily 
apparent in the prosecutor's initial decision to try two defendants to-
gether who have divergent approaches to testimony. In response to 
those who would argue that the fifth amendment does not prohibit co-
counsel's comment because the amendment restricts only state action, 
one must not overlook the state's vital role in joining defendants and 
denying severance.51 With this understanding of the development of 
the privilege against self-incrimination, the next Part examines the 
Supreme Court's decisions on prosecutorial commentary on a defen-
dant's silence. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF COURTROOM 
COMMENTARY ON DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL To TESTIFY 
In considering whether comment by co-defendant's counsel works 
as a violation of defendant's fifth amendment rights, it is instructive to 
examine the line of Supreme Court cases regarding comment on court-
room silence. Although the Supreme Court has not spoken directly to 
the specific issue of a co-defendant's comment on silence, the Court 
has considered how a prosecutor's comments can impair defendant's 
right to silence. This Part analyzes the theory behind the Court's 
holdings in these cases, particularly Griffin v. California 52 where the 
Court barred prosecutorial comments on defendant's silence. This 
Part also examines co-defendant's commentary on silence using ana-
lytical models provided by commentators and the Supreme Court. An 
51. Judge Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit aptly captured the state's involvement in co-defen-
dant's commentary on silence: 
The Federal Government cannot wash its hands of responsibility for the compulsion to 
testify resulting from the court's inaction. The exclusive control of the conduct of the trial is 
in the hands of the presiding federal judge. He is "not a mere moderator, but is the gover-
nor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions 
of law." He has the decisive role in assuring an accused a fair trial according to federal 
standards. "Federal judges are not referees at prize fights but functionaries of justice." 
De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 153 (5th Cir. 1962) (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, 
in Griffin v. California, where prosecutorial comment on silence was held unconstitutional, the 
Supreme Court noted the instrumental role of the judge in aiding this constitutional violation: 
"What the jury may infer [from the defendant's silence], given no help from the court, is one 
thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence 
against him is quite another." 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (emphasis added). Crucially, the Griffin 
court's statement applies equally to co-defendant's comments on silence. The court's inquiry 
focuses on the burdening of the defendant's rights and on the judicial acceptance of this coercive 
pressure, and not on the identity of the commentator. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
52. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
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assessment of co-defendant commentary on silence within the "imper-
missible burden" and "prohibited inference" models reveals that per-
mitting co-defendants to comment on a defendant's refusal to testify is 
unconstitutional. 
A. The Pre-Griffin Commentary Cases 
Although decided on statutory grounds, and not on fifth amend-
ment grounds, Wilson v. United States 53 has had tremendous impact 
on how the lower courts have dealt with the problem of identifying 
comments prejudicial to silence. 54 In Wilson, the Supreme Court re-
viewed petitioner's federal prosecution on charges of using the mails to 
provide information on obscene materials. During the trial, in which 
petitioner chose not to testify, the prosecutor stated in his closing ar-
gument: "[I]f I am ever charged with a crime ... I will go upon the 
stand and hold up my hand before high Heaven and testify to my in-
nocence of the crime."55 In response to the defendant's objection, the 
judge said: "Yes, I suppose the counsel should not comment upon the 
defendant not taking the stand."56 The Supreme Court held this ex-
change violated a federal law which provides that in trials before fed-
eral courts the defendant shall be allowed, at his own request, to 
testify, "'[a]nd his failure to make such request shall not create any 
presumption against him.' " 57 The Court reasoned that to insure the 
presumption of innocence, "comment, especially hostile comment, 
upon such failure [to testify] must necessarily be excluded from the 
jury."5B 
Wilson prohibited prosecutorial comment on silence in the federal 
court system, but did not foreclose it in the state courts. After re-
jecting one challenge to a California state law allowing such commen-
tary, 59 in 1964 the Supreme Court held in Malloy v. Hogan 60 that the 
fourteenth amendment prohibits state infringement of the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, the path was 
53. 149 U.S. 60 (1893). 
54. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text. 
55. 149 U.S. at 62. 
56. 149 U.S. at 62. 
57. 149 U.S. at 63 (referring to 62 Stat. 833 (1948) as codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1988) 
which was drafted to allow a defendant to be a competent witness at his own trial). 
58. 149 U.S. at 65. 
59. In 1947, the Court rejected a fourteenth amendment challenge to a California law al-
lowing comment on silence by "counsel" in Adamson v. California, holding that the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate all of the Bill of Rights guarantees. 332 
U.S. 46, 54 (1947). At this time both the Constitution of California, art. I, § 13 and the Penal 
Code of California § 1323 permitted commentary on defendant's silence by "counsel." Neither 
provision indicated whether "counsel" was meant to encompass a co-defendant's attorney. 332 
U.S. at 48 n.3. 
60. 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (the Court found t.hat a state court's contempt judgment against peti-
tioner for refusing to testify violated petitioner's fifth amendment rights). 
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clear for a challenge to state laws permitting prosecutorial commen-
tary on a defendant's silence. 
B. Prosecutorial Comment on Silence and the Fifth Amendment: 
Griffin v. California 
The Griffin v. California decision is tremendously important for 
understanding the Supreme Court's application of the fifth amend-
ment to commentary on silence. 61 In Griffin, the Court used an "im-
permissible burden" analysis to hold that it was unconstitutional for a 
prosecutor to refer to the defendant's invocation of his fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. Co-defendant commentary 
on silence is similarly unconstitutional under impermissible burden 
analysis. 62 
In Griffin, 63 petitioner sought review of his murder conviction in 
the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. During the trial, in which 
petitioner chose not to testify, counsel for the prosecution drew the 
jury's attention to the defendant's silence, remarking that the defen-
dant "has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain" the state's 
evidence. 64 The prosecution further commented that "in the whole 
world, if anybody would know [who committed the murder], this de-
fendant would know. Essie Mae is dead, she can't tell you her side of 
the story. The defendant won't."65 Furthermore, the judge's instruc-
tion to the jury on the issue of guilt, while noting defendant's right to 
refuse to testify, indicated that the jury was permitted to draw adverse 
inferences from defendant's silence. 66 Such remarks by the court and 
prosecutor were consistent at that time with the California 
Constitution. 67 
61. Although Griffin has not been overruled, the Office of Legal Policy of the Department of 
Justice has taken the position that Griffin was wrongly decided and provides an unnecessary 
impediment to effective criminal prosecution. See Report to the Attorney General on Adverse 
Inferences from Silence, 22 MICH. J.L. REFORM 1005 (1989). 
62. See infra notes 73-93 and accompanying text. 
63. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
64. 380 U.S. at 611. 
65. 380 U.S. at 611. 
66. Specifically, the judge told the jury: 
"As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can reasonably be expected to 
deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or if, though he 
does testify, he fails to deny or explain such evidence, the jury may take that failure into 
consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that among 
the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant 
are the more probable." 
380 U.S. at 610. 
67. Before it was repealed in 1974, CAL. CONST. art. I,§ 13 provided that defendant's "fail-
ure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be 
commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury." 
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 610 n.2. 
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The Griffin Court found the California law permitting the prosecu-
tor and judge to comment on a defendant's refusal to testify a violation 
of the fifth amendment. In so holding, the Court implicitly recognized 
that a defendant could be "compelled" to testify when the prosecutor 
suggests, but does not directly state, that the defendant's silence masks 
guilt. 68 The Court based its decision on the impermissible degree to 
which such prosecutorial comments place a cost on silence.69 Accord-
ing to the Court, such commentary amounts to "a penalty imposed by 
courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the 
privilege by making its assertion costly."70 
Importantly, the Court treated this cost as a "penalty imposed by 
courts," not one imposed by the state.71 This language suggests that 
the identity of the commentator is not as important as the effect of 
such commentary on the jury. Consequently, a court that acquiesces 
to a similar comment by a defendant's attorney in a multiple defen-
dant trial would also be imposing an unconstitutional penalty on si-
lence. The principles underlying Griffin can be fairly applied to co-
defendant commentary to show its abridgement of the fifth 
amendment. 
C. Analytical Models for Assessing Fifth Amendment Violations 
The reduction of the Supreme Court's analysis in Griffin to analyti-
cal models is helpful when considering whether the Court's reasoning 
can be faithfully applied to the issue of comment by co-defendant's 
counsel. Griffin and the later Supreme Court decision in Lakeside v. 
Oregon, 72 yield two analytical models - the "impermissible burden" 
68. A troublesome issue for the Court in its analysis of fifth amendment challenges has been 
the presence or absence of "compulsion." This issue surfaces because of the wording of the fifth 
amendment: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself ••.. " U.S. CoNsr. amend. V (emphasis added). If the clause is strictly interpreted, 
compulsion must be present for there to be a constitutional violation. 
The Court has not clearly indicated the contours of "compulsion." Compare Brooks v. Ten· 
nessee, 406 U.S. 605, 614 (Burger, J., dissenting) ("It is undisputed that petitioner was not in fact 
compelled to be a witness against himself, as he did not take the stand •.•. nor did the Tennessee 
procedure subject him to any other significant compulsion to testify other than the compulsion 
faced by every defendant who chooses not to take the stand •..• That should end the matter.") 
and Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 306 (Powell, J., concurring) ("A defendant who chooses 
not to testify hardly can claim that he was compelled to testify") with Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 
U.S. 333, 339 (1978) (''The Court concluded in Griffin that unconstitutional compulsion was 
inherent in a trial where prosecutor and judge were free to ask the jury to draw adverse infer· 
ences from a defendant's failure to take the witness stand."); see also Bradley, supra note 39, at 
1296 n.31 (contending that "[w]hile prosecutorial comment arguably does not 'compel' testi· 
mony, it may be said to compel self-incrimination. The prosecutor's argument is that the def en· 
dant's silence should be considered as evidence against him - that is, that the silence is 
incriminating. Thus, incrimination is compulsory by being unavoidable."). 
69. See infra text accompanying notes 73-93. 
70. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614. 
71. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614 (emphasis added). 
72. 435 U.S. 333 (1978); see infra text accompanying notes 96-97. 
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approach and the "prohibited inference" approach. These models, 
when applied to the present issue, demonstrate that co-defendant's 
comment on silence is unconstitutional. 
1. "Impermissible Burden" Analysis 
As the Griffin decision suggests, practices which pose an impermis-
sible burden on the exercise of fifth amendment guarantees are uncon-
stitutional. 73 A number of commentators have noted that the 
Supreme Court, in employing its impermissible-burden analysis, tradi-
tionally bases its conclusion on a three-prong test: (1) whether the par-
ticular practice burdens exercise of the involved right; (2) whether the 
practice impairs the policies underlying the right; and (3) whether a 
sufficient government interest warrants such impairment. 74 
Comments made by co-defendant's counsel on defendant's silence 
are unconstitutional under impermissible-burden analysis. Such com-
ments satisfy the first prong of the test. According to the Court, "the 
Griffin case stands for the proposition that a defendant must pay no 
court-imposed price for the exercise of his constitutional privilege not 
to testify."75 The Court, by limiting unconstitutional burdens to those 
that are "court-imposed," suggests that only practices over which the 
court has control demand judicial concern. Certainly, there are prices 
on silence that a court can not affect other than with a preemptive 
73. Subsequent cases provide additional examples of burdens held by the Court to be imper-
missible. In Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), the Court held that a judge's refusal, 
despite defendant's request, to instruct the jury on defendant's right to silence and the impermis-
sibility of inferences of guilt therefrom violated defendant's fifth amendment rights. Comparing 
this situation to prosecutorial comment on silence, the Court noted that "the penalty [on silence] 
may be just as severe when there is no adverse comment, but when the jury is left to roam at 
large with only its untutored instincts to guide it, to draw from the defendant's silence broad 
inferences of guilt." 450 U.S. at 301. 
In Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), the Court held that a Tennessee statute which 
forced defendant to testify prior to any of the other defense witness violated the fifth amendment. 
The Court stated that this statute was unconstitutional because it "exacts a price for [defen-
dant's) silence by keeping him off the stand entirely unless he chooses to testify first. This, we 
think, casts a heavy burden on a defendant's otherwise unconditional right not to take the 
stand." 406 U.S. at 610-11 (footnote omitted). 
One other post-Griffin decision suggests that impermissible burden analysis has not been en-
tirely embraced by the court. In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), a Rhode Island 
prison inmate was informed that his silence at a prison disciplinary hearing would be held against 
him. The Supreme Court upheld the Rhode Island law's presumption of guilt from silence. The 
Baxter court maintained that since no criminal proceedings were pending against the prisoner, 
Rhode Island's practice conformed with the fifth amendment. 425 U.S. at 317. The Court's 
reasoning is curious since the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to pro-
ceedings such as a prison disciplinary hearing. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 
Essentially, Baxter "cannot be reconciled with the numerous cases holding that the government 
is barred from penalizing an individual for exercising the privilege [against self-incrimina-
tion] .... " 425 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
74. See Ayer, supra note 35, at 855; Poulin, supra note 39, at 205-06 (" 'The threshold ques-
tion is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind 
the rights involved.' " (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971))). 
75. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301 (1981). 
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cautionary instruction - for example, the jury's possible equation of 
silence with guilt. A comment from a co-defendant's counsel, how-
ever, is certainly one practice the court can control. A cautionary in-
struction to the jury and admonishment of the attorney are well within 
a judge's capacity. Yet, when a judge acquiesces in the defense's preju-
dicial comments, the silent defendant must be said to have suffered a 
"court-imposed" penalty on silence. 
Moreover, the evidentiary value of such comments is dubious. 
Since these comments can easily result in an improper jury inference 
and cause a potentially prejudicial error, the court may appropriately 
control such commentary upon objection of defendant's counsel. One 
commentator has noted a qualitative difference between a factual pre-
sumption arising out of defendant's actions and an irrational presump-
tion penalizing a defendant's exercise of a constitutional right. 76 An 
example of this distinction can be seen in Barnes v. United States, 77 
where the Court upheld the traditional common law inference of guilt 
from the unexplained possession of stolen property. The Court stated 
that "[i]ntroduction of any evidence, direct or circumstantial, tending 
to implicate the defendant in the alleged crime increases the pressure 
on him to testify. The mere massing of evidence against a defendant [, 
however,] cannot be regarded as a violation of the privilege against 
self-incrimination.''78 
This factual presumption stands in sharp contrast to the presump-
tion created by allowing a co-defendant to comment on a defendant's 
silence. In no respect is it rational to infer guilt from silence. The 
Court and various commentators have indicated numerous alternative 
rationales for a defendant's silence. 79 Furthermore, since the defen-
dant's decision not to testify is a personal one, it cannot be empirically 
proved that the defendant was motivated by any one reason. At least 
one Justice has indicated that, with regard to drawing inferences of 
guilt or innocence from silence, "[t]here is simply no basis for declar-
ing a generalized probability one way or the other."80 
A co-defendant's comment on silence satisfies the second prong of 
the impermissible burden test. Such comments run directly counter to 
the policies behind the fifth amendment as identified by the Court. 81 
While a defendant is not faced with the "cruel trilemma" of self accu-
sation, perjul')j or contempt that existed prior to fifth amendment pro-
tection, he faces a "new trilemma ... perhaps more cruel than the one 
76. See Bradley, supra note 39, at 1296 n.35. 
77. 412 U.S. 837 (1973). 
78. 412 U.S. at 847. 
79. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
80. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
81. See Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55-56 (1964); supra note 45 and accom-
panying text. 
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it replaces": self-accusation by affirmative statement, self-accusation 
by silence, or perjury. 82 Permitting co-defendant's adverse comment 
also destroys the "fair state-individual balance" fortified by the fifth 
amendment. 83 The government's role in the criminal justice system is 
to produce sufficient evidence to prove defendant's guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt without relying on the defendant's aid. When courts 
allow a co-defendant to represent defendant's silence as guilt, the 
state's burden has been lightened against the will of the defendant. 84 
The defendant, in this situation, is forced through his decision not to 
testify to aid the case against him. If the government cannot compel 
defendant's testimony, courts should not allow the defense to compel 
it for the state's benefit. 
Allowing co-defendant commentary on silence negates the policy 
of protecting the "inviolability of the human personality."85 Once a 
defendant has chosen not to testify, the reasons for his choice and his 
thoughts remain his, out of the jury's reach. Treating silence as testi-
monial evidence, however, destroys this privacy and opens a "window 
to the defendant's private, unexpressed thoughts."86 
Lastly, the privilege against self-incrimination has historically been 
viewed as an institutional protection for the innocent. 87 Allowing a 
co-defendant to lead the jury to question the motive behind a defen-
dant's privileged silence imputes guilt to defendant and thus impairs 
this function. A defendant may have a number of reasons for refusing 
to testify aside from guilt. 88 A court that allows the co-defendant's 
suggestion that silence equals guilt to aid the prosecution's case viti-
ates any protection for the innocent that the fifth amendment purports 
to provide. 
Under the last prong of the impermissible burden test, the impair-
ment of fifth amendment policies must be balanced against the govern-
ment's interest in permitting co-defendant commentary on another 
defendant's silence. Often, a co-defendant who testifies finds that his 
82. Poulin, supra note 39, at 211 (referring to the ramifications of Griffin-type comment, but 
applicable here as well). 
83. 378 U.S. at 55 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 28, at 317). 
84. The state's burden will also be lightened against the will of the defendant whenever a co-
defendant testifies to facts tending to implicate the defendant. However, when this occurs defen-
dant's fifth amendment protection is not impinged since the co-defendant's testimony constitutes 
relevant factual evidence bearing on defendant's guilt. In contrast, comments by co-defendant's 
counsel as to defendant's silence do not constitute relevant evidence. The state's burden of prov-
ing defendant's guilt has been lightened by the fact that the jury is likely to reason improperly 
that silence masks guilt, thereby reducing the state's burden of proof. 
85. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55. 
86. Poulin, supra note 39, at 211. 
87. 378 U.S. at 55 (the privilege against self-incrimination, "while sometimes 'a shelter to the 
guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent' " (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 
162 (1955))). 
88. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
1024 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1008 
testimony lacks corroboration due to another defendant's silence. 89 
On occasion, co-defendant's counsel may, during her closing state-
ment, attempt to explain why her client's story is incomplete by 
stressing another defendant's failure to testify and to corroborate. 
Although the jury is supposed to base its decision solely on the facts 
before it, such explanations ask the jury to assume facts not in evi-
dence. Therefore, not only does this practice demand that the jury 
make a highly questionable assumption, but it severely prejudices the 
constitutional assertion of privilege by the silent defendant. The legiti-
macy of counsel's comments on her inability to corroborate her cli-
ent's story cannot outweigh the damage done to the other defendant's 
fifth amendment rights. In essence there is a trade-off. As a matter of 
policy and constitutional law, the commentary of the testifying defen-
dant's counsel must be limited. 
It is often claimed, or at least suggested by the court, that most 
comments on a defendant's silence are only meant to accentuate the 
testifying defendant's willingness to testify.90 The American justice 
system, however, provides that a defendant does not have to testify 
and therefore should accrue no additional benefit (aside from the con-
tent of his testimony) for doing so. The jury should not be encouraged 
to reward testimony and penalize silence - doing so is contrary to the 
very purpose of the fifth amendment. Furthermore, there is no need to 
remind the jury of a co-defendant's failure to testify. Justice Stewart's 
dissent in Griffin 91 informs us that "the jury will, of course, realize 
this quite evident fact, even though the choice goes unmentioned .... 
[It is] a fact inescapably impressed on the jury's consciousness."92 A 
testifying co-defendant does not have a sufficient interest in drawing 
the jury's attention to a defendant's silence or his own decision to tes-
tify to overcome the damage done thereby to the silent defendant's 
constitutional rights.93 
89. See, e.g., United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 110 
(1989). See infra text accompanying notes 133-43. 
90. See, e.g., United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127, 1136 (5th Cir. 1981) (counsel for 
one of the testifying defendants stated "[s]o I ask you to evaluate and weigh in [my client's] favor 
the fact that he took the stand in his own defense and he did not have to"); see generally text 
accompanying notes 126-30. 
91. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
92. 380 U.S. at 621, 622 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
93. Although no testifying defendant in any reported decision has raised the "missing witness 
rule" in support of his decision to comment on a co-defendant's silence, this argument merits 
some attention. The missing or uncalled witness rule owes its origin to Graves v. United States, 
150 U.S. 118 (1893), where the Supreme Court, in dictum, explained: "The rule even in criminal 
cases is that if a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony 
would elucidate the transaction, the fact that he does not do it creates the presumption that the 
testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable." 150 U.S. at 121. Application of this rule to the 
multi-defendant criminal trial in which one or some defendants choose not to testify is dubious at 
best. The rule is meant to prevent parties from withholding evidence and witnesses from the 
court. Therefore, for an inference to be drawn from a party's failure to present a witness, the 
witness must have been within that party's power to call. Clearly, this is not the case when the 
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2. "Prohibited Inference" Analysis 
Another model for examining potential violations of constitutional 
rights is the "prohibited inference model."94 Under this framework of 
analysis, any inference of guilt drawn from the exercise of the fifth 
amendment right to unqualified silence is constitutionally prohibited. 
As one commentator suggests, "[t]he appropriate inference to be 
drawn from the failure to deny is simply this: a person, guilty or inno-
cent, will deny guilt unless he perceives that the denial will be more 
costly than silence."95 
The Court used this model in Lakeside v. Oregon, 96 where the peti-
tioner argued that a nontestifying defendant's objections to a jury in-
struction cautioning the jury not to draw adverse inferences from the 
defendant's silence should bar the judge from giving this instruction. 
The prosecution reasoned that Griffin prohibited any comment by the 
state or the court on defendant's silence. The Supreme Court stated 
that "[i]t is clear from even a cursory review of the facts and the 
square holding of the Griffin case that the Court was there concerned 
only with adverse comment .... "97 In making this delineation be-
tween adverse and instructive comment, the Court suggests that some 
comments will not encourage the jury to draw negative inferences. 
The Griffin holding itself has been characterized by one member of the 
Court as based on a prohibited-inference analysis. Distinguishing 
Brooks v. Tennessee 98 from Griffin, Justice Burger stated that "the jury 
[was not] authorized or encouraged to draw perhaps unwarranted in-
ferences from [defendant's] silence, as in Griffin v. California. "99 
Examining the present debate under the prohibited inference 
model, it is clear that the practice of co-defendant commentary on 
silence urges the jury to infer guilt from defendant's privileged silence. 
Even comments that "merely highlight" a co-defendant's willingness 
to testify encourage a prohibited inference. By reaffirming a co-defen-
dant's cooperativeness, counsel necessarily creates a contrast between 
the testifying co-defendant(s) and the silent defendant(s). Asking the 
jury to draw the inference that a co-defendant should be rewarded for 
testimony of the "missing witness" is privileged. See Wheatley v. State, 465 A.2d 1110, 1111-12 
(Del. 1983) (inferences not proper because witness, an informer, was privileged and did not waive 
the privilege, nor did the defendant invoke discovery provisions to compel the informer's testi-
mony); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 286, at 201-02 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1979). 
94. See Bradley, supra note 39, at 1293; Poulin, supra note 39, at 222-28; Ratner, supra note 
39, at 491-92. 
95. Bradley, supra note 39, at 1293 (emphasis omitted). 
96. 435 U.S. 333 (1978). 
97. 435 U.S. at 338. 
98. 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (the Court held that a Tennessee statute which forced defendant to 
testify prior to any of the other defense witness violated the fifth amendment). 
99. 406 U.S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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testifying simultaneously and unavoidably asks the jury to draw the 
prohibited inference that silence should be penalized - i.e., that the 
nontestifying defendant should be found guilty. This unwarranted and 
irrational inference directly violates the fifth amendment. 
Under the impermissible burden and prohibited inference models, 
co-defendant commentary on silence violates a defendant's fifth 
amendment rights. Recognizing such comments as unconstitutional, 
however, does not bring the inquiry to an end. A further challenge 
arises in identifying which comments by co-defendant's counsel are, in 
fact, comments on a defendant's silence. Currently, the circuit courts 
which hold a co-defendant's commentary on silence unconstitutional 
are struggling to formulate a standard which effectively distinguishes 
colloquy from prejudicial remarks. The next Part examines this pur-
suit and recommends a standard which promises to guard a defen-
dant's fifth amendment rights more effectively. 
Ill. THE EVOLVING STANDARD FOR IDENTIFYING COMMENTS 
MADE BY Co-DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL THAT VIOLATE 
DEFENDANT'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
This Part explores the ways that the federal courts have dealt with 
the issue of co-defendant's commentary on a defendant's silence. This 
Part first explains how the courts have applied the Griffin 100 decision 
to instances of prosecutorial comment on silence and identifies which 
circuits have applied this same standard of impermissibility to com-
ments by a co-defendant's counsel. This Part next demonstrates the 
failure of the courts to apply this test faithfully and adequately to pro-
tect fifth amendment rights, and further criticizes the new test that has 
emerged from the Eleventh Circuit. This Part concludes by advocat-
ing a new test that promises to guard the fifth amendment rights more 
closely. Under this proposed test, counsel could not refer to the act of 
testifying or the decision not to testify. In proposing this test, this 
Note hopes to discourage courts from promoting form over substance 
by allowing glib counsel to draw a defendant's silence into question 
indirectly. 
A. Identifying Commentary on Silence: Application of Griffin 
After the Griffin decision, the duty fell upon the lower courts to 
proffer a test to identify "comment by the prosecution on the accused's 
silence."101 The test that emerged, however, was not predicated on 
Griffin, but instead on Wilson v. United States, 102 a decision which 
100. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prosecutorial comment on defendant's silence 
violates defendant's fifth amendment rights). See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text. 
101. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615. 
102. 149 U.S. 60 (1893); see supra text accompanying notes 53-60. 
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held prosecutorial comments on silence invalid on statutory 
grounds. 103 In Morrison v. United States, 104 the Eighth Circuit became 
the first of the circuit courts to apply the Wilson holding. The Morri-
son court found the prosecution's comment impermissible since "the 
language used [was] manifestly intended to be, or was . . . of such 
character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a 
comment on the failure of the accused to testify."105 Almost every 
court of appeals to judge prosecutorial comment since has adopted the 
Morrison test. 106 
Since the Griffin decision did not foreclose the argument that com-
ments made by co-defendant's counsel may violate another defen-
dant's fifth amendment rights, this challenge has been raised on appeal 
in a number of multiple defendant trials. The judicial response has 
varied from complete rejection to treatment identical to that for 
prosecutorial comment and, most recently, to calls for a separate stan-
dard for judging co-defendant's comments on silence. This Part next 
explores the three approaches in turn and attempts to arrive at a new 
approach which most effectively protects fifth amendment rights. 
B. The Sixth Circuit's Rejection of Challenges to Co-Defendant's 
Comments on Silence 
The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit which refuses to consider fifth 
amendment challenges to a co-defendant's comments on silence. This 
refusal, however, is built upon flawed reasoning. Beginning with 
United States v. Griffith, 107 the Sixth Circuit has shown its reluctance 
to look beyond institutional roles within the adversary process to the 
deleterious effects of a co-defendant's counsel's commentary on si-
lence. In Griffith, defendant Reynolds argued that the following ex-
103. 149 U.S. at 65-70. Although both the Griffin and Wilson decisions prohibit 
prosecutorial comment on defendant's silence, Griffin was based on constitutional grounds while 
Wilson relied on statutory grounds. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613; Wilson, 419 U.S. at 65. The 
lower courts devised a test to apply Wilson, and appear to have extended this test to determine 
Griffin violations. Compare Morrison v. United States, 6 F.2d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 1925) (devising 
a test to apply Wilson) with United States ex rel D'Ambrosio v. Fay, 349 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir.) 
(adopting the same test to identify Griffin violations), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 921 (1965). 
104. 6 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1925). 
105. 6 F.2d at 811 (the "Morrison test"). 
106. See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 983 (11th Cir. 1982); Runnels v. Hess, 653 
F.2d 1359, 1361 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 825 (5th Cir. 1980); 
United States v. Hozian, 622 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 
523, 527 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Harris, 627 F.2d 474, 476 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 961 (1980); Borodine v. Douzanis, 592 F.2d 1202, 1209-10 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Muscarella, 585 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1978); Catches v. United States, 582 F.2d 453, 458 (8th 
Cir. 1978); United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 63 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 
(1977); United States v. Wells, 431 F.2d 434, 435 (6th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 997 
(1971); United States ex rel D'Ambrosio v. Fay, 349 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 
U.S. 921 (1965). 
107. 756 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985). 
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change between co-defendant's counsel and a government witness 
impermissibly burdened his right to silence: 
Q. So that - now, you know that Mr. Reynolds can testify in these 
proceedings don't you? 
A. He sure can.108 
The court held that a defendant's fifth amendment rights were "not 
impaired when the comment on his silence was made by a codefen-
dant's counsel, not by the prosecutor."109 In so holding, the court 
relied chiefly on its previous decision in United States v. Whitley. 110 
In Whitley, defendant alleged that the testimony of a government 
witness under cross-examination by a co-defendant's counsel 
prejudiced defendant's right to post-arrest/pre-trial silence. 111 The 
Whitley court refused to extend the protections offered by Doyle v. 
Ohio, 112 which prohibited such comments by the prosecution.113 The 
Whitley court stated: 
[T]he aspect of the condemned inquiry [in Doyle] that makes it reversible 
error is the prosecution's emphasis on the defendant's post-arrest silence 
in an effort to imply a consciousness of guilt. . . . 
... Here, the question posed was not posed by the government, but 
rather by counsel for co-defendant. There also was no allegation that the 
government in any manner attempted to emphasize, highlight, refer to, 
or utilize the testimony elicited by co-defendant's counseI.114 
Arguably, the Griffith court's reliance on Whitley is misplaced 
since the former dealt with the fifth amendment implications of court-
room commentary on defendant's refusal to testify while the latter 
concerned the fourteenth amendment ramifications of such commen-
tary on defendant's post-arrest silence. Whitley does, however, indi-
cate that the prejudicial effects of such comments tum on the 
commentator's identity. The central flaw with the Sixth Circuit's rea-
soning is the court's failure to recognize the coercive pressure these 
comments place on a silent defendant. 115 When faced with the choice 
of either testifying or not testifying and consequently running the risk 
108. 756 F.2d at 1253. 
109. 756 F.2d at 1253. 
110. 734 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1984). 
111. 734 F.2d at 1135-36 (the government agent stated that his investigation was limited by 
the defendant's refusal after arrest to disclose any information). 
112. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). The Doyle court held that the State's attempt to impeach a defen-
dant with his post-arrest (and post-Miranda instruction) silence constituted a due process viola-
tion under the fourteenth amendment. 426 U.S. at 619. The fifth amendment implications of the 
State's action were not evaluated. 
113. 734 F.2d at 1136-37. 
114. 734 F.2d at 1137. 
115. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit's outlook on state action does not adequately address the 
state's role in joining defendants with antagonistic defenses and in denying severance. See supra 
note 51 and accompanying text; infra note 141. 
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of having the choice of silence portrayed as a likely indication of guilt, 
the fifth amendment is reduced to a hollow promise. 
The Griffith court focuses on the fifth amendment's promotion of 
an accusatorial justice system in which the government bears the full 
burden of establishing guilt. 116 This explains the court's concern over 
whether the comments on defendant's silence were directly used by 
the government in proving its case. The court, however, neglects to 
consider the equally integral purposes of the fifth amendment in pro-
tecting individual dignity and minimizing erroneous convictions.117 In 
light of these purposes, the fifth amendment guarantee prevents the 
jury from considering defendant's failure to testify as evidence and 
from drawing prohibited inferences from silence.118 The fifth amend-
ment is supposed to offer the protection of a " 'private enclave where 
[a defendant] may lead a private life.' " 119 Allowing co-defendant's 
counsel to comment adversely on a defendant's silence clearly puts 
these fifth amendment policy goals in jeopardy. Moreover, encourag-
ing a jury to equate silence with guilt and thereby ignore or give cur-
sory attention to the facts in evidence is likely to lead to erroneous 
convictions. The crucial issue therefore becomes not whether, but 
how, to identify when a co-defendant's comment impermissibly bur-
dens another defendant's fifth amendment rights. 
C. Application of the Morrison Test 
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit, a number of circuit courts have 
recognized the potential constitutional infringement of co-defendant 
commentary on silence, but have failed to devise a test for identifying 
such comments which can be faithfully applied to secure fifth amend-
ment protection. Before examining these attempts at exacting judicial 
definition of prejudice, it is instructive to tum to De Luna v. United 
States, 120 perhaps the premier case to hold co-defendant's comments 
on silence impermissible. 
Decided prior to Griffin, this Fifth Circuit case vigorously and ex-
haustively explores the contours of the fifth amendment. There, in an 
attempt to contrast defendant Gomez's willingness to testify with de-
fendant de Luna's silence, Gomez's attorney said: "Well, at least one 
man was honest enough and had courage enough to take the stand and 
subject himself to cross examination and tell you the whole story .... 
116. United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir.), cen. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985). As 
already indicated, ensuring a fair individual-state balance within the criminal justice system is an 
important goal of the fifth amendment. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
117. See w. LAFAVE & J. lsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 1.6 (1985). 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78, 94-99. 
119. Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
120. 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962). 
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You haven't heard a word from [de Luna]."121 Finding a violation of 
defendant's fifth amendment rights, Judge Wisdom, writing for the 
court, insightfully noted: 
If comment on an accused's silence is improper for judge and prose-
cutor, it is because of the effect on the jury, not just because the comment 
comes from representatives of the State .... 
. . . [T]he trial judge's approval of an improper comment or refusal to 
disapprove the comment and do whatever is necessary to protect a defen-
dant from being penalized by relying on his constitutional right amounts 
... to sufficient participation in the comment or sanction of the comment 
so that it may be properly characterized as a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment .... 122 
While De Luna offers a powerful argument for prohibiting co-de-
fendant's comment on silence, it does not adequately provide a test for 
determining which types of commentary impair fifth amendment 
rights.123 Some guidance in this pursuit appears to have been provided 
by the Morrison test, 124 which a number of circuits have applied to 
fifth amendment challenges to co-defendant's counsel's comment on 
silence. 125 
A careful analysis of these circuit court cases reveals that either the 
Morrison test is not applied strictly or that it is insufficient to protect 
nontestifying defendants from their co-defendants' indirect forays at 
silence. In most of these cases, co-defendant's counsel seeks to accen-
tuate her client's willingness to testify; however, in doing so, counsel 
often implies that silence amounts to guilt or that testimony should be 
rewarded. 
For instance, in United States v. Zielie 126 counsel for one of the 
defendants stated in his closing: "And [my client], the evidence we've 
proven, he's an honest and trustworthy man. He's one of the few 
who's testified. He stood up there and the prosecution worked him 
over. He was on that stand for a whole afternoon to defend his 
121. 308 F.2d at 143. 
122. 308 F.2d at 152, 154 (footnote omitted). 
123. De Luna commands that "[i]n a criminal trial in a federal court an accused has a consti-
tutionally guaranteed right of silence free from prejudicial comments, even when they come only 
from a co-defendant's attorney." 308 F.2d at 141 (emphasis added). Yet, the court failed to 
provide any guidelines on how to distinguish "prejudicial" comments. 
124. Under the Morrison test, the court must consider whether the comment was "manifestly 
intended to be, or was ... of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it 
to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify." Morrison v. United States, 6 F.2d 809, 
811 (8th Cir. 1925). See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
125. See, e.g., United States v. Zietie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1461 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 1189 (1985); United States v. McClure, 734 F.2d 484, 491 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1362 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127, 1136 (5th 
Cir. 1981); United States v. Aguiar, 610 F.2d 1296, 1302 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
827 (1981); United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir. 1976). 
126. 734 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985). 
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name."127 Another more blatant example is provided in United States 
v. Berkowitz, 128 where counsel for one of the defendants pleaded to the 
jury: "So I ask you to evaluate and weigh in [my client's] favor the 
fact that he took the stand in his own defense and he did not have to. 
He did not have to present any evidence whatsoever."129 In neither of 
these cases did the court find, as required by the Morrison test, that the 
comments were "manifestly intended or ... would naturally and nec-
essarily [be taken as] a comment on" another defendant's silence.130 
As an initial matter, it seems highly plausible, if not probable, that 
such commentary is intended to draw into question the nontestifying 
defendant's silence and thereby subtly incriminating that defendant. 
Moreover, when counsel asks the jury to reward her client for testify-
ing, it is hard to believe that a juror would not "naturally and neces-
sarily" take this also to be an implicit invitation to penalize the silent 
defendants. Therefore, if the Morrison test were applied strictly it 
would hold such comments made by co-defendant's counsel as imper-
missible commentary on a defendant's silence. 
Furthermore, if the courts refuse to apply the Morrison test to in-
stances of "mere favorable comment upon the fact that one of several 
co-defendants testified" then the test. is not adequate. 131 The com-
ments made by co-defendant's counsel in Zielie suggest that, first, the 
testifying co-defendant is an honest and trustworthy man since he tes-
tified, and second, that only honest and trustworthy men could with-
stand an afternoon of cross-examination. Implicit here is the idea that 
the silent defendant would have testified were he an honest and trust-
worthy man, and because he didn't testify he must be dishonest - i.e., 
guilty.132 
127. 734 F.2d at 1461. 
128. 662 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1981). 
129. 662 F.2d at 1136. 
130. 734 F.2d at 1461 (quoting United States v. Dearden, 546 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977)); accord, 662 F.2d at 1136. 
131. 662 F.2d at 1136-37 (quoting United States v. Hodges, 502 F.2d 586, 587 (5th Cir. 
1974)). A number of courts have held that a statement by counsel urging the jury to draw 
favorable inferences from his client's willingness to testify is not prejudicial to the silent defen-
dant. See, e.g., United States v. Petullo, 709 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Hines, 455 F.2d 1317, 1334-35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 975 (1972); United States v. 
Blue, 440 F.2d 300, 302-03 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 836 (1971); United States v. Hutul, 
416 F.2d 607, 621-22 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970). 
132. In United States v. Hines, 455 F.2d at 1334-35, the D.C. Circuit addressed similar co-
defendant's comments and based its decision on a comparison to the comments found impermis-
sible in De Luna. In Hines, defendant Ware's counsel, emphasizing his client's willingness to 
testify, remarked: "[Y]ou and I, if we were innocent, we would take the stand to try to exonerate 
ourselves. • . ." 455 F.2d at 1334. The court held that "the De Luna case involved a more 
serious trespass on the accused's Fifth Amendment rights." 455 F.2d at 1334. 
Chief Judge Bazelon, in dissent, noted "the comments made by [co-defendant] Ware's coun-
sel were not 'innocuous' and served to point out not that [defendant] Hines had a right to remain 
silent but that the innocent would not exercise that right." 455 F.2d at 1335 (footnote omitted). 
1032 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1008 
Moreover, asking the jury to draw a favorable inference from the 
act of testifying, as in Berkowitz, drastically undermines the purposes 
of the fifth amendment. It is obviously fair and necessary for the jury 
to consider a defendant's testimony and his demeanor on the stand 
from the standpoint both of determining facts and witness credibility. 
However, if the very act of testifying is rewarded, the silent defendant 
will suffer from the negative presumption that silence will create. It is 
not merely the damage done to a nontestifying defendant by this im-
plicit deprecation of silence, but the perversion of a criminal justice 
system designed to treat testimony and silence as equal, nonpresump-
tive choices and to place the entire burden of proof on the state's 
shoulders. 
D. The Eleventh Circuit's Mena Test 
The most recent and troubling judicial response to the issue of co-
defendant comment on silence has come from the Eleventh Circuit. 
Dissatisfied with the application of the Morrison test - with its origins 
in prosecutorial comment on silence - to co-defendant's counsel's 
comments on silence, the Eleventh Circuit has proposed a test which 
promises to allow more damaging and constitutionally suspect com-
mentary by co-defendant's counsel. This section discusses this test 
and demonstrates its inadequacy when viewed in light of fifth amend-
ment goals. 
In United States v. Mena, 133 the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the 
criminal narcotics conviction of eight defendants, six of whom chal-
lenged certain comments made by one testifying defendant's counsel in 
his closing argument. Counsel was attempting to explain his inability 
to corroborate his client's story beyond the corroboration offered by 
the other testifying defendant, Mr. Zuniga. Counsel stated: 
Now, this is difficult to be in this situation where you have - where 
all these defendants are here together. I can't call witnesses .... 
Again, I can't call any of these other people to say the same thing [as 
Zuniga said] .... 
. . . Mr. Zuniga got up on the stand .... He got up on the stand and 
the others didn't get up on the stand, and that's a right to get up on the 
stand. That's an absolute right. There is nothing wrong with that. He 
got up on the stand.134 
Appropriately, the court recognized that were it to apply the Mor-
rison test, it would have to conclude that such comments would " 'nat-
urally and necessarily' " be interpreted by the jury as a comment on 
Bazelon emphasized that "[i]f a co-defendant in a criminal trial chooses to remain silent, all 
commentary which invites an inference of guilt must be avoided." 455 F.2d at 1335-36. 
133. 863 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 110 (1989). 
134. 863 F.2d at 1533. 
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defendant's silence.135 The court, however, distinguished this case 
from those Eleventh Circuit cases in which this standard had been 
used because those cases involved mere favorable comment on a defen-
dant's willingness to testify, while in Mena "we are presented with an 
actual reference to the silence of the six defendants."136 In effect, the 
court suggested that when a clearer violation of defendant's fifth 
amendment rights occurs, the Morrison test is too easily satisfied and a 
test promising reduced protection for silent defendants should be used. 
In addition, the Mena court noted that the Mo"ison test is derived 
from cases of improper prosecutorial comment on silence. With re-
spect to this genesis the court posited: 
Given the prosecutor's institutional role, when the prosecutor merely 
"comments" on the failure of an accused to testify, the reference is in all 
likelihood calculated to encourage the jury to equate silence with guilt; 
reasonable judicial economy thus permits a finding of reversible error. 
When the "comment" comes from an actor (such as counsel for a code-
fendant) without an institutional interest in the defendant's guilt, how-
ever, it would be inappropriate to find reversible error as a matter of 
course. 131 
The court proposed a new test for assessing co-defendant comment on 
silence: "whether the comment actually or implicitly invited the jury 
to infer guilt from silence."138 Consequently and counter-intuitively, 
the court concluded that direct comment on defendant's silence ex-
poses the Morrison test as overly protective of defendant's rights and 
propounded a test designed to enable greater latitude in co-defendant's 
counsePs comments on defendant's silence. 
First, to say that the Morrison test results in a finding of reversible 
error as a "matter of course" is to distort gravely the truth. The only 
case where co-defendant comments have been found to impair silence 
unconstitutionally is De Luna, and in that decision the Morrison test 
was not even invoked. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit cases, United 
States v. Zielie and United States v. Vera, to which the Mena court 
refers, both held that the Morrison test had not been violated.139 
Lastly, even if the Morrison test does result in a more frequent finding 
of fifth amendment infringement than does the new Mena test, this 
should be recognized as the necessary price paid to secure constitu-
tional protections. 
135. 863 F.2d at 1533 (quoting United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1461 (11th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1989); United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1362 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
136. 863 F.2d at 1534 (contrasting Zie/ie, 734 F.2d 1447 and Vera;101 F.2d 1349 with the 
present case). 
137. 863 F.2d at 1534 (emphasis added). 
138. 863 F.2d at 1534. The court went on to find that under this test that the comments at 
issue did not prejudice the silent defendants' fifth amendment rights. 863 F.2d at 1535. 
139. United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1461-62 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1189 (1985); United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1363 (11th Cir. 1983). Although these cases 
do not explicitly mention Morrison, the test they use is, in fact, that used in Morrison. 
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The Mena court also raises a curious argument with respect to the 
role of the speaker and the intent of his comment. The court suggests 
that a co-defendant's counsel lacks the institutional intent to lead the 
jury to infer guilt from silence. The court overlooks the considerable 
benefits to be gained from throwing the blame on one's co-defen-
dant.140 By subtly leading the jury to conclude that silence masks 
guilt, defense counsel can implicate his co-defendant without trigger-
ing the need for a severance.141 
Furthermore, the Mena test focuses too closely on the intent of the 
comment, rather than its effects. A test relying on whether the jury 
was "invited" to infer guilt from silence neglects to consider the dele-
terious effects flowing from an objectively unintended comment.142 
While malicious intent to impair constitutional rights should be de-
terred, the primary purpose of such a test should be to guard against 
the infringement of rights. The Mo"ison test speaks more clearly to 
this primary purpose by holding impermissible comments "naturally 
and necessarily" taken to be inferences of guilt by silence. It would be 
little consolation to a defendant if the jury inferred a defendant's guilt 
because of a comment not intended to cause this effect. 
In the final analysis, the Mena test affords inadequate protection of 
fifth amendment rights and encourages co-defendant forays at defen-
dant's privileged silence. This standard for impermissibility leaves the 
defendant's constitutional right to unfettered silence at the mercy of a 
co-defendant's intention. While the Morrison test offers firmer protec-
tion for silence, as applied by the courts it does not adequately prevent 
140. See Dunmore, Comment on Failure of Accused to Testify, 26 YALE L.J. 464, 467 (1917). 
141. In federal court, "[t]wo or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or 
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction •••• " FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 8(b). A shrewd co-defendant might recognize that his innocence is more likely to be 
recognized by a jury when the jury has another defendant available to convict. Plainly, there are 
certain strategic advantages that accrue to jointly-tried defendants with antagonistic defenses. 
This in no way implies that joinder would always benefit defendants with antagonistic defenses. 
For instance, one defendant may not wish to appear before a jury in the presence of another 
defendant who is unlikely, for whatever reason, to provoke jury sympathy. 
Because the judiciary has embraced having joint trials, severance, even in cases of truly antag-
onistic defenses, is difficult to obtain. Actually, the "mere fact that there is hostility between 
defendants or that one may try to save himself at the expense of another is in itself alone not 
sufficient grounds to require separate trials." United States v. Hutu), 416 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 
1969) (quoting Dauer v. United States, 189 F.2d 343, 344 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 
(1951)). Nonetheless, creating the implication that one defendant's decision not to testify reflects 
his guilt, aids the testifying defendant's case and offers less fodder for severance than direct 
accusation. 
142. To understand the Mena test's failures, consider whether the court should allow a co-
defendant's attorney to say in her closing: "You will notice, of course, that defendant X testified 
today while defendant Y did not." Strictly applying the Mena test, it is arguable that this com-
ment does not "invite" a prohibited inference. However, it poses a great enough risk to defen-
dant Y's fifth amendment rights compared to its minimal legitimate purpose that it should be 
impermissible. It is simply unnecessary and of dubious benevolent intent to point out, however 
indirectly, another defendant's decision not to testify. 
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indirect adverse commentary on silence.143 
E. A Proposal for a Standard of Impermissible Co-Defendant 
Commentary on Defendant's Courtroom Silence 
Because of the insufficient protections for silence currently af-
forded by the Morrison and Mena tests a new rule is in order: a defen-
dant's counsel should not be permitted to refer to the fact that either 
his client or another defendant testified or chose not to testify. Coun-
sel should be permitted to comment on the content of testimony before 
the court and the witnesses' credibility since this constitutes evidence 
upon which the jury can legitimately base its verdict. The act of testi-
fying or the willingness to do so, however, does not and should not 
constitute probative evidence if the fifth amendment is to be accorded 
proper respect. A closing argument that accentuates a defendant's 
willingness to testify and the link between his innocence or honesty 
and his decision to testify necessarily draws jury speculation on other 
defendants' silence. For the fifth amendment to operate effectively, 
the justice system cannot allow silence to be manipulated by defense 
counsel for evidentiary purposes. 
The Morrison test is inadequate not because of its wording or 
structure, but because of the court's inability to apply it faithfully. 
The Mena test does not offer any greater guidance to the courts. As 
indicated, this new test may, in fact, place effective fifth amendment 
protection in greater jeopardy than the Morrison test. Despite these 
two tests, numerous decisions indicate that counsel for a testifying co-
defendant is consistently permitted to refer indirectly to another 
defendant's refusal to testify. 144 Whether such commentary comes in 
the form of a remark on the co-defendant's "exemplary" willingness to 
testify145 or counsel's inability to corroborate his client's story,146 the 
jury is unavoidably sent a second message. Underlying such seemingly 
benign comments is the implicit invitation to the jury to speculate on 
the motives for the nontestifying defendant's silence. Faithful applica-
tion of the Morrison and Mena tests would indicate the specious na-
ture of such remarks. Yet, because of the judiciary's reluctance to 
pursue the implications of this commentary on silence, allegiance to 
the principles of fifth amendment protection can only be secured by 
prohibiting all commentary on the act of testifying or on the limita-
tions imposed on some defendants by another defendant's silence. 
143. See supra text accompanying notes 124-32. 
144. See supra notes 107-10, 126-30, 133-38 and accompanying text. 
145. See, e.g., United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1189 (1985); United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1981). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 126-32. 
146. See, e.g., United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 110 
(1989). See supra text accompanying notes 133-43. 
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The ideal solution to this problem would be to eliminate multiple 
defendant trials. The conventional wisdom, however, is that 
"[u]nquestionably, joint trials are more economical and minimize the 
burden on witnesses, prosecutors, and courts. They also avoid delays 
in bringing those accused of crime to trial."147 Nevertheless, the prej-
udice and confusion inherent in joint trials is manifold. Among the 
commonly recognized problems are complexity leading to jury confu-
sion, guilt by association, prejudice emanating from co-defendants' 
confessions implicating defendants, antagonistic defenses, conflicts in 
trial strategy, and co-defendants' criminal records. 148 Yet, as long as 
multiple defendant trials continue to be perceived as "cost effective" 1 
this practice undoubtedly will continue. In the alternative, therefore, 
comments by co-defendant's counsel on defendant's silence must be 
proscribed. 
Some may argue that denying a defendant the opportunity to point 
out his decision to testify prevents counsel from zealously representing 
the client and hurts that defendant. In this instance, a defendant suf-
fers minimal detriment. The jury will, of course, recognize the fact 
that a defendant testified without a reminder from counsel. Further-
more, any advantage that defendant might accrue from testifying 
comes at the price of prejudicing another defendant's constitutional 
choice. 
Under the proposed test, to prevent such prejudice, counsel would 
not be permitted to say: "Remember, only my client was secure 
enough in his innocence to testify today" or "Unfortunately the other 
defendants' constitutionally protected decision not to testify prevents 
me from further corroborating my client's story." Applying this 
Note's proposed standard, these remarks clearly refer to the act of tes-
tifying and not to the content of the testimony or the defendant's cred-
ibility. If a timely objection is made, the judge should instruct the jury 
to disregard this comment and should reiterate the nonpresumptive 
nature of the decision not to testify. If the silent defendants are con-
victed and challenge on appeal the remarks made on their silence, the 
appeals court should, using the proposed test, recognize these com-
ments as pertaining to the act of testifying and then determine whether 
these actions constituted prejudicial or harmless error in this case.149 
147. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 143 (1968) (White, J., dissenting); see also Rich· 
ardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987) ("Joint trials play a vital role in the criminal justice 
system •... "). 
148. See Calo, Joint Trials, Spillover Prejudice, and the Ineffectiveness of a Bare Limiting 
Instruction, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 21, 35 (1985) ('~oint trials result in prejudices that burden a 
defendant's right to a fair trial."); see generally Dawson, Joint Trials of Defendants in Criminal 
Cases: An Analysis of Efficiencies and Prejudices, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1379 (1979). Professor 
Dawson concludes that "(t]he uncertain benefits of joint trials and the mischief they so frequently 
work justify a statute or rule of court giving defendants rights to separate trials." Id. at 1452. 
149. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (holding that a Griffin error does not 
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CONCLUSION 
This Note addresses the undermining of constitutional protections 
by attorneys who choose to exploit the joining of testifying and nontes-
tifying defendants. Because of the perceived efficiency of joint trials, 
however, greater judicial grants of severance are unlikely. Therefore, 
judges have a duty to administer a judicial system in which the Consti-
tution affords realistic protection against compulsion to testify. The 
tests created thus far to identify co-defendant's commentary on a de-
fendant's privileged silence have proved ineffective and unfair to the 
silent defendant. Under the current standards, courts run the great 
risk of encouraging the jury to reward testimony and penalize silence. 
Consequently, in order to uphold the promise that the fifth amend-
ment holds forth to all criminal defendants, co-defendant's counsel 
should not be permitted to comment on any defendant's decision 
either to testify or remain silent. 
Subtle attempts to suggest that the refusal to testify signifies guilt 
subvert the constitutional framework upon which the American crimi-
nal justice systems rests. Statements by co-defendant's attorneys on 
their client's willingness to testify or on the.problems of corroborating 
the testifying defendant's story due to another defendant's silence 
serve a minimal legitimate purpose while potentially putting into jeop-
ardy the nonpresumptive quality of a constitutionally protected 
choice. Such a practice runs counter to the fifth amendment's histori-
cal purpose and subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court. 
- Martin D. Litt 
require automatic reversal and that the reviewing court should affirm a conviction if it finds the 
error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 
